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INHERITANCE.
ANCESTRAL PROPERTY.

The 9th section of the act of April 8th, 1833, contains the
proviso, qualifying the preceeding dispositions: "Provzded also,
That no person who is not of the blood of the ancestors or other
relations from whom any real estate descended or by whom it
was given or devised to the intestate, shall in any of the cases
before mentioned, take any estate of inheritance therein, but
such real estate subject to such life estates as may be in existence by virtue of this act, shall pass to and vest in such other
persons as would be entitled by this act, if the persons not of the
blood of such ancestor or other relation had never existed or
were dead at the decease of the intestate." The act of May
25, 1887, P. L. 261, 2 Stewart's Purdon, 2000, which provides
for cases in which estates pass to the next of kin, and in which
one or more of the next 6f kin are grand parents, repeats the
same principle in the same language.
THE ANCESTORS OR OTHER RELATIONS.

The principle operates only when the land of the intestate
has come to him from some ancestor or other relation. A husband
or wife is not such ancestor or relation. These words mean,
says Sergeant, J., "persons connected in the line of inheritable
blood, which can never be predicated of the husband and wife, in
legal phraseology." Hence a wife, as devisee of her husband, becomes a new proprietress. Any one of her blood may inherit
from her the land devised, although he has not the blood of the
devisor.' Lowrie, C. J., assigns two reasons for this view, (a)
'Culbertson v. Duly, 7 W. &. S., 195; Kinney v. Glasgow, 53 Pa. 141.
193
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she is not of his blood; (b) because, taking the devise in lieu of
dower, she becomes a purchaser.! Hence, the wife dying intestate
leaving land devised to her by her husband, her nephews and
nieces, being next of kin, will take the land, to the exclusion of
relatives of the husband.' If she leaves surviving her one legitimate and two illegitimate children, the illegitimate will inherit
along with the legitimate the land devised to her by her husband,
under the act of April 27th, 1855, although the illegitimate are
not of the blood of the husband.' A brother is not an ancestor
or "other relation" intended. If land descends from one brother
to another, says Gibson, C. J., questions concerning being of the
blood of the former will be irrelevant. 6
SEVERAL DESCRNTS.

Land, after being acquired by A, may be transmitted by
him, by descent or devise to B; and by B to C; and by C to D,
and so on indefinitely. On the death of the last owner, it would
be necessary that the claimant by inheritance should be of the
blood, not merely of C, or of B, but also of A. A purchased
land from a stranger. He devised it to his son B. B devised it
to his daughter C. At C's death, the land descended to her son
D. The heirs of D must be of A's blood.'
NOT OF THE BLOOD.

The capacity to inherit, under the conditions mentioned in
the proviso sujbra, depends on the possession by the claimant of
the blood of the ancestors or other relations, from whom the
land came. He must be "of the blood" of such ancestor. A
could be "of the blood" of X, by being descended nearly or remotely from X. In Hart's Appea A died, owning land which
had come to him from his great-great-grandfather on his father's
'Walker v. Dunshee, 38 Pa., 430.
'7 W. & S. 195.

4

Opdyke's Appeal, 49 Pa. 373.
5Baker v. Chalfant, 5 Wh. 477. But the question was as to the right
of a half-sister to inherit in preference to remoter relatives of the whole
blood. The half-sister was that of both of the brothers. In Eckert's
Estate, 5 W. N. C., 451, land descended from the father to A, and devised by A to his brother B, was, at B's death, held incapable of being
taken by the mother.
6
Lewis v. Gohrman, 5 Pa. 164.
78

Pa. 37.
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side. This person was also the great-great-grandfather of his
mother. Hence, as A's half-brothers and sisters ex-larte vaterna, had the blood of this. person, they were allowed to take
the land, on A's death, intestate, in preference to cousins of A,
on his father's side. But the claimant of land, which has come
to the intestate from X, does not need to have been descended
from X. It is enough if he and X trace their descent from some
common person. The nephews and nieces e. g. of X, the perquisitor, may claim the land, on the death, intestate, and without issue, or other nearer qualified relatives, of the person to
whom the land descended from or was devised, by X.'. The
principle is rejected that in ascertaining the fountain of inheritable blood, we cannot go further back than the ancestor or
other relative from whom the intestate immediately received the
estate. "A person," says Bell J., citing Story J., "is with the
most strict propriety of language, affirmed to be of the blood of
another, who has any however small a portion or the same blood
derived from a common ancestor. 9'
THE NEXUS BETWEEN THE PERQUISITOR AND HIS SUCCESSOR.

The ancestor or other relation, "from whom any real estate
descended, or by whom it was given or devised to the intestate"
is the characterization of the relationship between the perquisitor
and his successor. Inheritance offers a simple case. When B
inherits land from A, those who claim, as heirs of B, must, in
the cases mentioned in the sections preceding the 9th section of
the act, be of the blood of A, as well as of B." If A gratuitously devises the land to B, the claimant by inheritance on B's
death, must be of A's ,blood." The devise maybe to an unborn
child, a daughter subsequently born taking in pursuance of it.
sRanck's Appeal, 113 Pa. 98.
9Hart's Appeal, 8 Pa. 37. "The plaintiffs," said Woodward, J., "have
blood in common with him (the perquisitor) no matter how little, and
the defendant has none. He cannot, therefore, take." Parr v. Bankhart, 22 Pa. 291.
1"Henszey v. Gross, 185 Pa., 353; Perot's Appeal, 102 Pa., 257; Montgomery v. Petriken, 29 Pa., 119; Williams v. Ross, 46 Pa., 369; Parr v.
Bankhart, 22 Pa., 291.
"Kinney v. Glasgow, 53 Pa., 141; Hartman Estate, 4 R. 39; Lewis v.
Gorman, 5 Pa., 164; Teas' Appeal, 23 Pa. 223; Clepper v. Livergood, 5
W. 113; Ranck's Appeal, 113 Pa., 87; Eckert's Estate, 5 W. N. 451;
Glass v. Glass, 6 C. C. 408.
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She dying, only those can inherit who are of the devisor's
blood."
DEVISE CHARGED WITH LEGACIES.
3

In Roberts' Appeal" A devised land to his son B charged
with legacies to the other children. B paid some of the legacies
and died. The land was then sold by the administrator for
debts and the rest of the legacies were paid from the proceeds.
The residue of the proceeds was distributable as land. Woodward, J., remarks "Possibly a question might have been raised
upon the facts before us, whether Jacob Roberts (B), taking the
estate by devise from his father, charged with legacies which he
paid, was not a purchaser."
It was not necessary to decide,
nor did the justice decide the question. In Simpson v. Hall, 1 A,
the owner of a small improvement, was killed by the Indians in
1776. After his death, a warrant -embracing the improvement
and other land, was taken out by A's brother, in the name of B,
a daughter of A, an infant. A had no legal or even equitable
title to the improvement, and the warrant was paid for by funds
of B. 5 Gibson, J., could not see how an estate, to which A had
no title, legal or equitable, could be said to have come from him
to his daughter B. "It may be, where the title is in the ancestor, and the land comes to the heir incumbered or charged to the
amount of its full value that the discharging it out of funds coming by another ancestor or acquired by the heir himself, shall
not be considered as a new purchase for a valuable consideration; and even this is a hard case and going beyond the object
intended to be secured by the legislature, but perhaps inevitably
arising from the necessity of having a rule adapted to all cases.
But I would not go further and say, where the ancestor had
neither title nor beneficial interest, he should nevertheless be
considered as having transmitted the estate to his descendant."
The justice supposes the case of a contract by A to purchase
land, and none or but a part of the purchase money had been
paid by him at his death, or where encumbrances to the full
amount of the value had been discharged by the heir, with his
"2 Dowell v. Thomas, 13 Pa. 42.
1339 Pa. 417.
144 S. & R. 337.
15The fact that these funds had come from A, would not make the
land ancestral.
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own funds. These would "in substance and effect" be new
purchases by the heir, but the justice, conceding that the reason
for the rule concerning ancestral property, "woould not hold,"
declared "I am not prepared to say the estate would not be considered as having come" from the ancestor.
CHARGES ON LAND DEVISED CONTINUED.

A will devised land to John, a son, subject to the payment
of $1700 to another son James, and $700 to a daughter Ann
Eliza. John was not to be deemed a purchaser. The land was
ancestral:'
A by his will, gave to his wife for life, the use of
his house, with fire-wood, etc., and $25 annually in lieu of
dower, and to his daughter $100, to be paid by his son Richard.
The tract of land was devised to Richard subject to the devises
to the wife, and certain rights to use a spring given to another
son, Joseph; and the will imposed on Richard the duty of paying the legacies to the wife and daughter. Richard paid the annuity to the testator's wife, his mother, and the legacy to the
daughter. It was held that his whole estete in the land, not
simply the fractional interest that he would have taken under
the intestate law, had the father left no will, was ancestral.
"The legislative intent here is plain," says Agnew, J., "that
the entirety and not the parts only, shall be subject to the rule
of the blood." The fact that a pecuniary burden was imposed
on Richard did not make him a purchaser of the shares in the
land which, had his father died intestate, would have gone to
his brothers and sisters, the testator not manifesting the "intention to treat the devise not as a gratuity but as a sale." The
justice satisfies himself that the burden in favor of the widow
was simply a commutation of the burden of dower; and that
making the $100 payable to the devisee's sister, did not show an
intention to treat the devisee as vendee. If it were considered
as the price of a part of the land, the will does not indicate of how
large a part. The land is not valued by the will. "There being no testamentary rule by which the land can be apportioned
between the gratuity and the encumbrance, there is no reason to
' 6Banes v. Finney, 209 Pa. 191.
"If the testator "plainly indicates" the intention to treat the devisee
as a vendee, and to increase the burden [on the devisee] because he has
increased the quantity devised [has devised more than would have been
taken by inheritance] "a different case might arise," (!!) says the justice. But what answer to it?
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conclude that the testator meant to devise any portion of the
land in consideration of the payment of the charge upon it.""s
TAKING AT A VALUATION.

If the land is directed by the testator to be appraised, and a
son X allowed to take it, and he takes it at the appraisement,
the share only which he would have taken under the intestate
law will be ancestral. He will be perquisitor of the other shares.
"Having taken directly under the will," says Gibson, C. J.,
"he was a gratuitous devisee of his own share, but a substantial purchaser of the rest."
Hence, he dying, leaving a
mother and brothers and sisters, the mother was held entitled to
a share, under the act of April 19th, 1794 (superseded by the act
of 1833) in the parts that under the intestate law, would have
passed to the brothers and sisters, but for the will, but not to a
share in that part which he would have himself taken had his
father died intestate. 9
CEASING TO BE ANCESTRAL.

Land descends from their father on two brothers, as tenants
in common. One of them B, buys the share of the other, A.
On B's death, the undivided half brought by him is not ancestral, and it will pass to relatives of a certain propinquity, whether
they are ex harle lpaterna or ex parte materna. The other half
will be inherited only by the relatives on the father's side.'
PERSONAL PROPERTY.

The principle of ancestral property is, by the language of
the act of April 8th, 1833, confined to "any real estate" descended, given or devised. Land which is ancestral may be sold,
and the question may arise whether the money obtained for it is
to be treated as the land, should the former owner of the land
die. If land of a minor is sold in partition proceedings, the
"'Kinney v. Glasgow, 53 Pa. 141, Gibson, J., said that "where the
land has been paid for in part by the ancestor and in part by the heir out
of his own funds" the person not of the blood of the ancestor "must take
all or none." Simpson v. Hall, 4 S. & R., 337, 343.
"gHartman's Estate, 4 R. 39. The appraisement was not made but a
public sale was made at which the son became purchaser. This purchase
was treated as equivalent to an acceptance at an appraisement. Cf.
Lewis v. Gorman, 5 Pa., 164.
20Baker v. Chalfant, 5 Wh. 477.
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minor's interest in the proceeds is personalty and as such will,
at his death during his minority, devolve on others.'
A sale
by a lunatic's committee, of his land for the payment of debts,
works no conversion, and upon his subsequent death, the proceeds will be inherited as land.22 If a woman devises land to
her son, authorizing, but not requiring, the executor to sell it,
and the executor sells it, taking a mortgage for the purchase
money, this mortgage is personalty, and upon the son's death,
the paternal uncle will take in preference to, as being nearer of
kin than the maternal cousins.' But if the power given to the
executors is to sell for cash or on credit or on ground rent and
the executor sells reserving a ground-rent, it is held that this
ground-rent must be treated as the land out of which it issues
was; viz. as coming from the devisor. Ofn the death of the devisee intestate, only those could inherit, who were of the blood of
the devisor.2 The court said "The direction to sell for cash must
be absolute, unconditional, in order to work a conversion. Here
the executor had the discretion either to sell for cash or to convert the lot into real estate of a different kind."
DIRECTION TO SELL.

ELECTION TO TAKE AS LAND.

When an ancestor by will directs a sale of his land so as to
equitably convert it into money, the person who is to receive the
money may elect to waive the sale, and accept the land, but, by
so doing, he virtually becomes the buyer of the land by means
of the money which, had it been sold, he would have got from
it. He thus becomes the perquisitor of the land, although the
means by which he buys it, is obtained from the ancestor.
Hence, on his death, the land passes to heirs, without regard to
their being of the blood of the ancestor.n The property, says
Rogers, J., came to the devisee "iffiproved with the character of
money. It was by an act of his own that it was reconverted
into land. The very act of election implies a choice between
the two species of property, and effects a change in the nature of
"Walles' Estate, 161 Pa. 218; Wentz's Appeal, 126 Pa. 541.
22
Hart's Appeal, 8 Pa., 32; Lloyd v. Hart, 2 Pa. 473. Cf. Eckert's
Estate, 5 W. N. 451.
2
3Mason's Appeal, 3 Walker, 107.
24Howard's Appeal, 2 Penny. 347. No conversion occurred in
Perot's Appeal, 102 Pa. 257.
2Burr v. Sim, 1 Wh. 252; Fisher's Estate, 2 Woodw. 323.
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the property itself. If the property had been sold by the executors in pursuance of the directions of the will, and the devisee had become the purchaser, as he might, there can be no
doubt that it must be viewed in the light of a new acquisition.
Where then, can be the difference, when by an act of his own he
elects to consider that as land, which otherwise has the impress
fixed upon it as money. It is a purchase of it as land, by a surrender of the right which he undoubtedly had to consider it as
26
money."
WHEN HUSBAND

IS PSRQUISITOR.

A husband is none the less a perquisitor of land, because he
acquired it after his marriage, and because the wife's industry and
economy contributed to its acquisition. The marriage was a
gift of these to the husband. The land descending from him to
a son, who died intestate and without issue, paternal uncles, and
cousins will inherit to the exclusion of maternal uncles.2
CONVEYANCE

inter vivos.

"The ancestors or other relations from whom any real estate
descended or by whom it was given or devised," is the phrase
of the act of 1833. Similar language of the earlier acts, was understood to refer to gifts by conveyance inter vivos. "' A mother
conveyed land to a daughter for the consideration of "one dollar,
as well as in consideration of natural love and affection."
Three years later, the grantee died intestate, leaving uncles and
first cousins on the father's side and second cousins on the
mother's side i. e. children of X who was a daughter of Y, who
was a brother of the grantor. The first cousins would take, as
nearer of kin, if the land was not ancestral. It was held that the
The land
materna inherited the land."
second cousins ex tare
was valuabie. One dollar "is so insignificant and infinitesimally
small," says Mestrezat "when compared with the real value of
the property as to show conclusively that it was named in the
deed merely as a matter of form by the conveyancer, he entertaining the mistaken notion that some consideration beyond that
of love and affection was necessary to give the deed validity, and
transfer the title."
The land having been "given," although
Simpson v. Kelso, 8 W. 247; Moffit v. Clark, 6 W. & S.258.
2'Parr v. Bankhart, 22 Pa. 291.
"Hartman's Estate; 4 R. 39; Miles v. Smith, 27 C. C. 218.
"Lynch's Estate, 220 Pa. 14.
2Cf.
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by a conveyance, was ancestral. In Miles v. Smith' A died intestate, and his widow and children made amicable partition of
the land. A purpart was taken by a son Charles. This purpart was conveyed by the widow and all the children to a trustee
in trust to pay the rents to Charles, during his life; after his
death, to pay the rents to William H., a son of Charles, until he
should reach the age of 21, and then to convey the land to him.
After Charles death, the trustee conveyed the land to William
H. As William H. received the land as a gratuity from his
father, at his death intestate it passed to those only who were of
the blood of Charles, his father.
SOME RESULTS OF THE RULE.

MOTHER.

If land descends or is obtained by devise or gratuitous conveyance ex l5arte Paterna, it cannot be inherited from a son even
by his mother. The perquisitor has been the father. On the
son's death intestate, remote relatives of his father, whom he has
never seen, in whom he has had no interest, whom, indeed, he
may have cordially hated, are preferred. to the woman, with
whom he has lived possibly 40 years, and who is the mother of
his children." The husband's brother," or his remoter relatives,
will take, to the exclusion of his widow. A died leaving a widow
and a daughter B. M, brother of A, married his widow, and
had a daughter C. M died and his land passed to his daughter
C. C died intestate and without issue. The land passed, not
to her mother, except for life, but to B, daughter by her first
marriage."
FATHER.

For reasons similar to those which exclude a decedent's
mother, his father-will be excluded from the inheritance. The
land may have come to the decedent, from his mother, or from
her parents, or from some other of her relatives. Since his
father has not her or their blood, he will be pretermitted in favor
of those who have it." A inherited land from his maternal
3027 C. C. 218.

31Hartman's Estate, 4 R. 39; Miles v. Smith, 27 C. C. 218; Eckert's
Estate, 5 W. N. C. 451; Bevan v. Taylor, 7 S. &. R. 397; Howard's Appeal, 2 Penny. 347; McWilliams v. Ross, 46 Pa. 369; Robert's Appeal,
39 Pa. 417.
"Glass v. Glass, 6 C. C. 408; Moffit v. Clark, 6 W. & S. 258.
"Emes v. Brown, 1 Am. L. Reg. 634.
•'Clepper v. Livergood, 5 W. 113; Moyer v. Thomas, 38 Pa. 426; Sturgeon v. Hustead, 196 Pa. 148.
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grandfather. Thoie of this grandfather's blood will inherit to
the exclusion of A's father, and half brothers and sisters, not
children of his mother.'
PARENTS TAKE LIFE ESTATES.

The 3d section of the act of April 8th. 1833 provides that in
default of issue of the decedent, the real estate shall go to the
father and mother of such intestate, during their joint lives and
the life of the urvivor of them. The principle concerning ancestral property forbids that an estate of inheritance should go
to any who are -not of the blood of the perquisitor. It is in no
way inconsistent with the devolution of a life estate upon father
or mother, or both. 6 A dies, leaving his mother, a paternal
uncle, and a paternal grandfather. He was seized of land which
had descended to him from his father. In ejectment against his
mother, his parental relatives could not recover, because she was
entitled to the land for life."'
RELATIVES OTHER THAN PARENTS.

When the land has come to the decedent, from a relative of
one side, relatives, however remote, of that side will take, to
the exclusion of relatives, however near, of the other side. A
died, seized of laud inherited from his father, leaving no parents,
nor brothers and sisters, but paternal aunts and maternal uncles.
The former and not the latter inherited from him. 8 A mother
devises land to her children, who die without issue. The land
passes to relatives upon her side and not to relatives on the
father's side. 9
BROTHERS AND

SISTERS OF THE HALP-BLOOD.

Brothers and sisters of the whole blood and father and
mother of a decedent are allowed to inherit a fee in preference
to brothers and sisters of the half-blood. These however inherit
in preference to all others than the former, and than the issue of
the decedent. But the principle of participation in the blood of
the perquisitor applies. If A has obtained land from his father,
3Caughey v. Harrar, 21 Lanc. 353.
36

McWilliams v. Ross, 46 Pa. 369; Moyer v. Thomas, 38 Pa, 426;

Miles v. Smith, 27 C. C. 218; Himmelspark's Estate, 8 Dist. 183; Lee's
Estate, 15 Phila. 545. The act of 1794 did not make provision for a parent's taking even a life-estate, 38 Pa. 426.
3
McCarthy v. McCarthy, 4 Phila. 323.
38Parr v. Bankhart, 22 Pa. 291; McWilliams v. Ross, 46 Pa. 369.
39
Walker v. Dunshee, 38 Pa. 430.
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a half-brother, son of the same father, can inherit, but a halfbrother, son of the same mother will not." A acquires land and
dies. The estate passes to his brother B, who then dies. The
half-sisters of B, since they are also half-sisters of A, the perquisitor, may inherit." A, the perquisitor, dies, leaving two
sons, B and C. He devises the land to B. B dies intestate,
leaving a daughter and a widow. The widow marries B's brother,
C, and has a son, who is therefore the half-brother of B's daughter. On the death of this daughter, her half-brother, since he
has the blood of her father,-being son of her father's brother,
-can inherit to the exclusion of her uncles, other brothers of
her father."
APPEAL.OF RANCK.

In Appeal of Ranck'3 land descended from A to his son B,
and from B to B's son C. B's wife, C's mother, was the sister
of X, who married a niece of the perquisitor A. The nephews
and nieces of A were related to the decedent C in the fifth degree. X had children who, computing through their mother,
as niece of A (now dead) would have been in the sixth degree.
Computing through their father, the brother of C's mother, they
were cousins, i. e. of the fourth degree. They were not allowed
to inherit, and C's land passed to the nephews and nieces of the
perquisitor, there being no representation of a deceased child of
a sister of a grandfather. The court refrains from any justification of its decision except the remark that the children of X
and of a deceased niece of A, were one degree more remote from
the perquisitor than his surviving nephews and nieces, and the
further remark that if the contention of the children of X were
"logically correct" and their mother were still living, "they
would take to her exclusion, although they now claim their inheritable blood through her." The syllabus is preposterous and
unintelligible. The doctrine, if doctrine there be, seems to be
that, if a descendant, W, of a perquisitor marries a stranger to
the blood, and a blood relative of that stranger X, marries
another descendant of the perquisitor Y, with the effect of mak"Simpson v. Hall, 4 S. &. R., 337; Henszey v. Gross, 185 Pa. 353;
Irwin v. Covode, 24 Pa. 162; Henderson's Estate, 51 Pitts. L. J. 98; 17
York, 88.
"1Baker v. Chalfant, 5 Wh. 477.
42Banes v. Finney, 209 Pa. 191.
'3113 Pa. 98.

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

204

ing his progeny nearer of kin to the child of W, though remoter
from the perquisitor than Y and Y's brothers and sisters,
Y and Y's brothers and sisters, though thus remoter from the
descendant, will inherit, and not the children of Y.
EXCLUSION

OF NON-PARTICIPANTS

IN

BLOOD

NOT ABSOLUTE.

HUSBAND OR WIFE.

If no kindred of the blood of the ancestor from whom land
has descended, or by whom it has been devised or conveyed, is
discovered, and there is a husband or wife of the decedent, this
husband or wife will take such estate as the intestate had."
Husband and wife are ordinarily not of each other's blood.
HUSBAND FORFEITS RIGHT TO INHERIT.

The 5th section of the act of May 4th, 1855 P. L. 430; 3
Stewart's Purdon, 2460, enacts that "No husband who shall
have as aforesaid, for one year or upwards, previous to the death
of his wife, willfully neglected or refused to provide for his wife,
or shall have for that period or upwards, willfully and maliciously deserted her, shall have the right to claim any right or
title in her real or personal estate, after her decease, as tenant
by the courtesy or under the intestate laws of this commonwealth." It is not our intention to examine here, the decisions
upon this statute.'
wIFE FORFEITS.

A wife is not prevented from inheriting her husband's estate as sole heir by an elopement from him, and living with an
adulterer. 8
NON-PARTICIPANTS NOT HUSBAND OR WIFE.

The 11th sections of the act of April 8th, 1833 provides that
"Section 10, act of April 8th, 1833. If A dies leaving a sister and
his widow, the sister takes the fee, The widow does not; Gallagher's
Estate; 7 Dist. 335. In Coal Co. v. Coal Co., 65 Pa. 435, G died leaving
a widow and no kin, lineal or collateral, save his mother. His mother
since died. It is mysteriously said by Agnew, J., that the property did
not escheat but went to the widow who executed a deed for the land. If
the land went in fee to the mother how did it pass over to the widow?
In Patterson's Estate, 195 Pa., 78, a wife who claimed against the will of
the husband, who had no kindred, and whose will gave the estate to
strangers, was held entitled only to one half of the personalty, and to onethird for life of the realty.
4"See 3 Stewart Purd. 2460.
46Adose v. Fossit, 1 Pears. 304.
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in cases not previously provided for,- the real and personal estate shall pass to the next of kin of the intestate without regard
to the ancestor or other relation from whom such estate may
have come. In default of all entitled under previous provisions of
the act and of all who would be entitled under the 11th section, the
12th section directs that the real and personal estate shall vest
in the Commonwealth by escheat. Thus, only after all relatives, however remote, of the perquisitor, and such relatives
failing, only after the husband or wife, and in order to prevent
escheat to the state, may the relatives of the decedent who are
not of the blood of the ancestor from whom the land came in7
herit it.1

JUSTIFICATION OF THE

RULE

CONCERNING

ANCESTRAL

PROPERTY.

In Moffit v. Clark" Huston, J., modestly declined to "enter
into the propriety or correctness of the feeling which inclines in
favor of that stock of ancestors whose labor or industry acquired any property in preference to another stock which in no
way contributed to its acquisition."
"Nothing could be more
reasonable," thought Gibso l , J., "than that a transfer, made
either by the act of the party or the operation of the law, and
which was merely gratuitous, and in consideration of consanguinity, should continue no longer than the consideration lasted,
and that instead of going to strangers to the consideration, the
property should revert to the blood of the ancestors from whom
it moved." The object, as he conceived it, of the rule, is to
prevent an estate accumulated by one family from being drawn
out of it by a half-blood link into a family of strangers." The
law gives the owner in fee, the power to convey it gratutiously, or
to devise it to whomsoever he will. The last owner's wish,
rather than that of the perquisitor, is thus allowed to prevail,
and the last owner may choose to give it to those who are of his
blood although not of that of the perquisitor. The perquisitor
is really not appreciably more interested in relatives who are
linked with him through a common ancestor, three, four, five,
"Dowell v. Thomas, 13 Pa. 41. The case stated said that the heirs
lineal and collateral of the perquisitor, became extinct so far as the parties to it knew. This was enough to justify the court's assuming that
they were extinct. Cf. Parr v. Bankhart, 22 Pa. 291.
186 W. & S. 258.
1gSimpson

v. Hall: 4 S. & R. 337.
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six generations back, than in persons who have become related
by intermarriage with his descendants. If the perquisitor was
a father or grandfather, there might be reason for confining the
descent of his land to those of his blood, but there is no substantial reason for extending the operation of the principle to ancestors of indefinite remoteness.
THE

WHOLE AND HALF BLOOD.

The English law absolutely excluded kindred of the half
blood, of whatever degree, from the inheritance. Blackstone's
explanation and apology for this principle, may be found in the
second volume of his Commentaries at page 224 el seq. A half
brother or sister could, under that law, never inherit, nor could
an uncle or aunt, the half brother or sister, of the parent of the
deceased. The distinction between relatives of the whole and
of the half blood has been eliminated from the law of this state,
except in the case of brothers and sisters, and the descendants of
brothers and sisters. If A dies without issue, but leaving brothers
and sisters of the whole blood, or their children or grand children
and brothers and sisters of the half blood, or their children or
grandchildren, the former will inherit; the latter will not inherit.'
If there are no children of the whole blood, or their issue, but
there are parents or a parent, and brothers and sisters of the half
blood or their issue, the parents, or if one only is alive, the parent will take the fee, and the brothers and sisters of the half
blood, or their issue, will take nothing." But, if there are no
parents, and no collaterals, other than brothers and sisters of the
half blood, or their issue, and collaterals remoter than brothers
and sisters, the brothers and sisters of the half blood, or their
issue, will inherit. The half blood is not excluded, but postponed. The right of the half blood to take, under the circumstances just indicated, is a right to take as well land which was
acquired by the decedent, as land which he had derived from an
ancestor. In the latter case, the half blood must be of the
blood of the perquisitor.' A sister of the half blood can take
ancestral land descended from his father, only if she is the
50Sec. 4, Act of April 8, 1833; 2 Stewart Purd. 1998; Stark v. Stark,
55 Pa. 62.
5"Stark v. Stark, 55 Pa. 62.
"Baker v. Chalfant, 5 Wh. 477.
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daughter of the same father,' or her father is otherwise of the
blood of the perquisitor.5' A dies, leaving land that came to
him from his father. A mother and a half-brother, (son of the
same mother by a later marriage), and a sister of his father survive him. The father's sister will inherit.55
HALF-BLOOD

IN

OTHER

THAN BROTHERS

AND SISTERS.

We have already observed that the English law which discriminated against relatives of the half-blood of every degree,
has been preserved only in the case of brothers and sisters and
their issue. The father or mother of the decedent may have
had a brother or sister of the whole blood, and a brother or sister of the half blood, and these may survive the decedent, and
be as next of kin, entitled to the estate of the decedent. No
distinction is made between them, they inherit concurrently
from their nephews or nieces." A had a sister of the half
blood [of a different mother] and brothers and sisters of the whole
blood. A died leaving a son. The son died, his next of kin
being these uncles and aunts. His father's sister of the half
blood, inherited along with the brothers and sisters of the whole
A dying, leaving to survive her eight cousins of the
blood."
whole blood, and two of the half blood, a bill asking for partition of A's land among cousins of the whole blood only, the
court decided that all the cousins, both those of the half blood
and those of the whole blood, were owners by descent from A. 58
5Id.
5
1Land was devised by A to his son B, and from B descended to B's
daughter, D. B's wife (D's mother), subsequently married a brother of
B, and had a son E, by him. D was then a half-sister to E, by a common
mother but their fathers were brothers, sons of the perquisitor A. On
the death of D her half brother E inherited, in preference to the sons of
A, one of whom was his own father. Banes v. Finney, 209 Pa. 591.
65Henszey v. Gross, 185 Pa. 353.
5Davis' Estate, 9 W. N. 479, affirmed in Kiegel's Appeal, 12 W. N.
179. Partition, at the suit of the uncle of the half blood was allowed.
57Danner v. Shissler, 31 Pa. 289. In Lynch v. Lynch, 132 Pa. 422, A's
will created a life estate in B, and disposed invalidly of the remainder.
As to it therefore he died intestate and this remainder vested in B as
heir. At B's death, it passed to his uncles and aunts, brother and sister
of A5of the half as well as of the whole blood.
aDorsey v. Van Horn, 9 W. N. 95. What is meant by a cousin of
the half blood is not stated.
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HALF-BLOOD AS

uRSPECTS PERSONALrY.

The 4th section of the act of April 8, 1833, directs that the
personal estate of an intestate, when it goes to brothers and sisters, or their issae, shall go "without any distinction of blood."
The act of 1797 had directed that when the intestate left personal property, but no widow nor issue, no father nor mother,
"but brothers and sisters of the whole and half-blood, or their
representatives, it shall be distributed equally between the
brothers and sisters, bdth of the whole and half blood or their
representatives." Under this act, it was held, A dying, leaving
personalty and a brother of the whole blood, and a brother and
sister of the half blood, (children of a different mother) they all
took the personal estate equally.5" A died in 1877, intestate and
without issue. There survived her eight cousins, children of
her parental uncle [brother of the mother of the whole
blood] a maternal aunt of the whole blood, and two
cousins, children of a sister of her mother, of the half
blood. The two cousins of the half blood participated in the
distribution, along with the cousins of the whole blood. ' The
syllabus of Miller's Estate6 ' represents the case to decide that
there is no distinction, as respects personalty, between brothers
and sisters of the whole, and brothers and sisters of the half
blood. The contest, however, was between brothers and sisters
of the half blood exy5artebaterna,and brothers and sisters of
the half blood ex tarle materna. For some reason the auditor
awarded the fund to the former class exclusively. The court,
sustaining exceptions awarded the fund to both sets of claimants.
PER CAPITA AND PER STIRPES.

When all who take a decedent's property, according to the
act of 1833, are of the same degree of propinquity, they take per
capita, that is equal shares. Thus, if they are grandchildren,
they take equally, although the children of one deceased child
59

Miffiin v. Neal, 6 S. &. R. 460. A similar view was taken under

the act of 1794. which made no distinct provision for the ease, in Preston
v. Hoskins, 2 Y. 545.
6aGraham's Estate, 6. W. N. 402; affirmed in Hayes' Appeal, 89 Pa.
256. The cousins took the shares that their respective parents would
have taken, by representation, and not per capita.
6t2 Woodw. 174.
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may be more numerous than those of another,. ' A has had two
sons, B and C. B has died leaving one son. C has died leaving
seven sons. These eight grandchildren will each take oneeighth of the estate, although B, if alive, would have had a
right to one half. When those who inherit are of unequal degrees of propinquity, those who are nearest, takeer cafita with
those of the same degree who are deceased, leaving issue. This
issue then takes per stirpes; that is, takes what the deceased ancestor would if alive, have taken.
A dies, leaving a son B,
two grandsons, C and D (sons of another son now dead), and
four great-grandsons, sons of a son (now dead) of a son (now
dead). B would take one third; C and D each one sixth, and
the four great grandsons each one twelfth. A similar provision
is expressly made, in the case of brothers and sisters of the decedent and children of such brothers and sisters, The brothers
and sisters take per capita, such share as would have been
theirs had the deceased brothers and sisters, whose children survive. been themselves alive, and the children of the deceased
would take the share of the deceased parents. When there were
only nephews and nieces, they took per capita or equal shares,
although one of them was the child of one brother, and seven of
them the child of another." One brother left one child, another
four, and another nine. The fourteen nephews and nieces took
per capita.'
When there were nephews or nieces, and the child
or children of a deceased nephew or niece, the former took per
capita, and the latter the share which the deceased parent would
have taken if alive.'
No representation was allowed beyond
brothers' and sisters' children. The act of April 27th, 1855,
provided for representatlon by grand-children of brothers and
sisters, and by the children of uncles and aunts, by the parents.
When grandchildren of brothers and sisters take along with children of brothers and sisters, or with brothers and sisters, they would
take thus. If there is a brother or sister, two nephews, children of
62Eshelman's Estate; 74 Pa. 42.
r1A dies leaving two children and eight grandchildren, children of a
deceased child. The estate must be divided into three shares. Each
child takes one-third; and the eight grandchildren the remaining third;
Hoch's Estate, 154 Pa. 417; Eshleman's Estate, 74 Pa. 42.
6"Estate of DeHaven, 1 Cl. 336 (1843): Illig's Estate, 3 Luz. Leg.
Obs. 102.
"Miller's Appeal, 40 Pa. 287; Krout's Appeal, 60 Pa. 380.
"Ortt's Appeal, 35 Pa. 267.
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another deceased brother, and three grand-nephews, children of
a deceased child of another deceased brother, the brother would
take one third, the two nephews, each one sixth, and the three
grand nephews each one ninth." If the third son died leaving a
son M, and two grandsons, children of a deceased son N, the
third which this son, if living would have taken, will be divided
into two parts, one of which will go to M, and the other be
equally divided between the children of N.
GRAND

NEPHEWS AND CHILDREN OF UNCLES.

When grand nephews or nieces, or children of uncles, take
by representation of their parents in pursuance of the act of
April 27th, 1855, it was originally held that, though there were no
brothers or sisters, or nephews or nieces, or uncles or aunts in existence to inherit; that is although those inheriting were all of the
same degree of consanguinity, they did not take5er cabi/a, that is,
equal shares, but only the shares which their respective parents,
would, if alive, have taken. One uncle left two children,
another four, and another five. They were held not to take jer
capta, but ]ber s/irfes. The two children took each one sixth;
the four each one twelfth, and the five each one fifteenth.'
The
act of June 30th, 1885 directs that whenever those who are to
take an estate under the intestate law "stand in the same degree of consanguinity to the intestate," they shall take in equal
shares. This act does not repeal the act of April 27, 1855, in so
far as it provides for the grand children of brothers and sisters,
or the children of uncles and aunts, taking an intestate's estate,
when the brothers and sisters or the uncles would have taken,
if living; but it repeals the act of 1855 in so far as it gives such
grand-children of brothers and sisters, and such children of
uncles and aunts, the share only which the deceased parent
could have taken, if alive, even when those who take are all such
nephews and nieces, or such children of uncles and aunts. Under the act of 1885, when the persons entitled are all of these
61

A dies, leaving children of a dead brother, and a grand child of a deceased sister. The latter takes per stirpes; that is, the part which the
parent would have taken, if alive. Lane's Appeal, 28 Pa. 487. The
nephews take per capita, the children of a deceased nephew the share
that he would have taken if alive; Krout's Appeal, 60 Pa. 380; Lebo's
Appeal, 3 Luz. Leg. Obs. 103.
6Brenneman's Appeal, 40 Pa. 115; Hayes' Appeal, 89 Pa. 256; Cf.
Rogers' Estate, 131 Pa. 382; McConnell's Appeal, 5 Super. 120.
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classes, they take per capita. A died, without issue, leaving
neither parent, nor brother nor sister, nor descendant of them,
nor uncle nor aunt, but leaving children of deceased uncles and
aunts.

They took per capila.9
GRANDPARENTS.

If A dies leaving both his maternal grandparents and his
paternal grandmother, and uncles and aunts, on both sides, the
grandparents, being in the second degree of kinship, will take
to the exclusion of the uncles and aunts, who are in the. third
degree. The three grandparents being equidistant, will take
equally/her cajita, each receiving a third. It would be a new
and anomalous principle, that would give to the maternal grandparents one-half and to the paternal grandmother the other
half. 9
6Cremer's Estate; 156 Pa. 40; McConnell's Appeal, 5 Super. 120.
7
°Fisher's Estate, 2 Woodw. 823.
[To be continued in next issue]
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MOOT COURT
FREEMAN v. FERRIS.
Trespass by Throwing Stones.-Injury to Person.-Proximateness of Effect.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Ferris, a boy ten years of age, with a crowd of other boys, was
throwing stones through the windows of an abandoned mill. The mill belonged to Freeman, and, unknown to the boys, he was in the building at
the time. As Ferris threw a stone, Freeman stepped to the window and
was struck in the eye by the stone thrown by Ferris. This is trespass
for the resulting injury.
Conway for Plaintiff.
O'Brien for Defendant.
OPINION OF COURT.
EDWARDS, J.-In view of these facts, it is true that Ferris was a
trespasser q. c. f. by the throwing of the stone into the property of the
plaintiff and also is it true that if he had broken a window pane in any of
the windows he would have been liable for the damage done. But in that
case it would be the direct, natural and probable consequence of his act.
If Ferris had thrown a stone at a bird and the stone had hit the
plaintiff there is no question but what he would be liable. Now it does
not appear defendant was breaking windows, and as most boys at the
age of ten would do, with a crowd of other boys was throwing stones in
a window of an abandoned mill. There is not a chance in a thousand that
any one would be in an old abandoned mill, and if there were he might
step to any one of a hundred windows. Therefore the one point which
we think this case rests on is: Was the damage done to plaintiff's
eye the natural and probable consequence of defendant's throwing of the
stone?
Where defendant does an illegal or mischievous act which is likely to
prove injurious to another, it has been held that he is answerable for the
consequences which directly and naturally result from his conduct though
he did not intend to do the particular injury which followed., 3 Cyc.
1068.
Again the fact that a man is a trespasser does not render him liable
for any injury to which the fact that he was a trespasser may have contributed as a remote contributing cause or condition. He is only liable
for the injuries which are the natural and probable consequences of his
acts. (Thompson on Neg. 60, Hollenback v. Johnson, 29 N. Y. Supp. 945;
28 A. & E. 606, 46 Century Dig. 459) 14 D. L. Review 222.
In D. L. Review, Purdon v. Kress, a case in whichl defendant had
become intoxicated and went into yard of plaintiff, then plaintiff coming
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out in the dark fell over defendant and broke her arms, it was said "The
question therefore arises: Was the injury to Mrs. Purdon the natural
and probable consequence of Kress' act? This would depend upon where
Kress was lying. If he was lying in a remote and unfrequented part of
the yard, Mrs. Purdon's injury would probably not be regarded as the
natural and probable consequence of his act. If on the other hand he
was lying upon the path which led from the house to the street, the fall
of Mrs. Purdon and the consequent injury would undoubtedly be the natural and probable consequence of his act." Then making a comparison
of the cases could we not say this was an unfrequented place the same as
a remote corner of the yard? We think it would be analogous and the
consequence is too remote. It would seem to be against public policy to
allow boys to throw stones in a man's property and injure him without
the injured one having redress. But in view of the former case it-appears too remote and plaintiff cannot recover.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT.
That boys ten years old can commit, and be liable for, a trespass is
not disputable. Not more disputable is the proposition that, when they
hurl stones through the wihdows of a mill, belonging to X, into the mill,
they commit a trespass within it. While then Ferris was thus committing a trespass in the mill he struck the eye of Freeman. Why is he
not liable therefor?
The injury to the eye was as direct a consequence of the act, in respect to the time involved in its production, and to the number of intervening conditions between the hurling of the stone and its impact against
the eye, as can ordinarily be found. The stone was still in its flightwhen
it encountered the eye. The blow to the eye was then the consequence
of the presence of the eye at the place where it was, at the time it was
struck, and of the flight of the stone, imparted to it by the boy that
threw it.
But was the transition of the course of the stone, through the point
at which the plaintiff's eye was, at the moment when the eye was there,
a conjuncture that should have been anticipated as not unlikely? Apparently, "It is a fundamental principle of law applicable alike to breaches of
contract and to torts, that in order to found a right of action, there must
be a wrongful act done and a loss resulting from that wrongful act; the
wrongful act must be the act of the defendant, and the injurv suffered
by the plaintiff must be the natural and not merely a remote consequence
Within the rule [above stated]
*
*
*
of the defendant's act.
the natural effects are those which might reasonably be foreseen, those
which occur in the ordinary state of things, and proximate effects are
those between which and the injury there intervenes no culpable and effi*
The general rule in actions tor tort is that
*
cient agency. *
the wrongdoer is liable for all injuries resulting directly from the wrong.
ful -acts, whether they could or could not have been forseen by him, provided the particular damages in respect to which he proceeds, are the
legal and natural consequences of the wrongful act imputed to the defendant and are such as, according to common experience, and the usual
course of events, might reasonably have been anticipated." 13 Cyc. 25,
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28. In Drake v. Kiely, 93 Pa. 492, liability for a sickness arising from
the tortious imprisonment of a boy, ten years old, was assumed to depend
on the sickness being the proximate effect of the wrong. Sterrett, J.,
in explaining such effect, quotes Hoag v. R. R. Co., 85 Pa. 293, as defining natural and probable consequence, as "such a consequence as,
under the surrounding circumstances of the case, might and ought to
have been foreseen by the wrongdoer as likely to flow from his act."
In Fairbanks v. Kerr, 70 Pa. 86, flag stones lying in a street were
broken by a crowd, collected by Fairbanks, who was making a speech in
the street. While it was not conceded that collecting the crowd was a
criminal nuisance, the court considered that, even if it was, the liability
for the breaking of the stones would depend on "whether the defendant's
making his speech in the street was the probable and proximate cause of
the" injnry," whether, the effect was "within the probable range of ordinary circumspection when engaged in the act."
Ordinarily the law takes no note of the mental or moral idiosyncrasies of individuals. It requires as much foresight and prevision of
possible consequences from the unlearned as from the learned, from the
stupid and dull as from the alert, intelligent, active-minded, from females as from males. But concession has been made to persons on the
score of youth. The boy is not required to have as much imagination,
attention, memory, knowledge, which only experience of the world can
give, of the nexus of phenomena, and of the likely consequences of a
specific act, as the man. There is no presumption that a boy 10 years old
is capable of appreciating danger to himself and therefore of being negligent. 13 P. & L. Dig. 21680. Even an infant of 14 years, is not held to
the same degree of prudence as a man of mature years. But the mental
faculties involved in care are the faculties involved in the anticipation of
the results of acts or failures to act. We think the defendant's liability
would depend on his capacity, not that of an experienced adult, who has
seen how often the unexpected happens.
The court below has undertaken to decide that the injury to the eye
was not so far not improbable that the defendant should have anticipated
it as a possible effect, and should for that reason, have refrained from
hurling the stone. Whether a consequence is "natural and probable" or
not, should be foreseen or not, even by an adult, is ordinarily for the
jury. The capacity of a boy ten years old to be negligent, generally, and
particularly in not anticipating a result, is also for the jury. Fairbanks
v. Kerr supra; Drake v. Kiely, supra. Hence, we are obliged to remand
the case for another trial.
Reversed with v. f. d. n.

TOME v. HARGELRODE.
*Discharge in Bankruptcy. -Subsequent Promise to Pay Debt.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Hargelrode owed John Tome a thousand dollars; becoming bankrupt, his estate was distributed among his creditors, Tome receiving four
hundred dollars. Notwithstandinghis discharge from debts, Hargelrode,
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feeling his moral obligation to pay Tome, on three several occasions paid
him fifty dollars. This is assumpsit for the balance of the debt, with interset, namely five hundred and twenty-five dollars.
Fritz for Plaintiff.
Graupner for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
McKINNEY, J.-Although the effect of a discharge in bankruptcy is
to extinguish a pre-existing debt, not merely to bar the remedy upon it,
yet the moral obligation of the debtor is a sufficient consideration to support an express promise to pay it. This is the doctrine of all the. cases,
and it is unnecessary to cite authorities in support thereof.
Justice Clark, in Hobough v. Murphy, 114 Pa. 358, said there could
not arise a promise by implication, as the mere acknowledgment of a debt
could create no liability if in point of fact no debt existed; and, further,
that the promise upon such a consideration to pay a debt from which the
debtor had been legally discharged, must be a clear, distinct, and unequivocal promise to pay the specific debt without qualification or condition.
The rule as to the measure and quality of proof necessary to establish
such a promise is certainly, from the nature of the case, not less rigid than
has been required to establish a valid acknowledgment or promise to defeat the operation of the statute of limitations; and in Burr v. Burr,
2 Casey 284, it is said that to remove the bar of the statute, the acknowledgment must not only be clear, distinct and unequivocal as to the existence of the debt, but that it must also be plainly referable to the very debt
upon which the action is based. It matters not where the uncertainty lies,
whether in the acknowledgment or in the identification of its existence:
it is equally fatal to the plaintiff's recovery.
So in Landis v. Roth, 16 W. N. C. 309, the evidence was that the
debtor said: "I will pay you $600 in thirty days on the note; I will pay
you the rest as quick as I can. We will pay you every dollar if we have to
pay it out of our own pockets." Yet the court said that the debt was
not sufficiently identified. Many other cases might be cited to illustrate
the character and quality of proof required in such a case. But those to
which we have referred are sufficient for the purpose.
In the case now under consideration the defendant was discharged
in bankruptcy from all the debts existing. The plaintiff undoubtedlygot
his share in the distribution of the bankrupt's estate; the debt was therefore discharged by the decree. The alleged promise upon which this
action is -based is the payment of fifty dollars by the defendant upon three
separate occasions. There is no reference made as to any specific debt
but a statement that the defendant felt moraliy obligated to the plaintiff
in some manner.
In Field's Estate, 2 Rawle 351, Chief Justice Gibson says: "It seems
to be agreed that a debt discharged by a certificate of bankruptcy is a valid
consideration for a promise. How this opinion came to be adopted I am
at a loss to imagine. Contracts are made in reference to the existing
laws which tacitly become a part of the stipulations of the parties; so
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that the creditor, looking to the possibility of the debtor's bankruptcy,
indemnifies himself for the risk in the enhanced price of his commodity:
and standing his own insurer, he cannot, even in conscience, object to
bearing the loss. Beside, having taken the benefit of the commission, at
the expense of all the bankrupt's remaining prospects, he elects to receive in full satisfaction exactly what the law allows him and absolves
the bankrupt from further obligations, either in honour or conscience."
In as much as there nowhere appears in this case an express promise
to pay the old indebtedness but a mere acknowledgment of the debt by
the payment of money at three different times we arp of the opinion that
judgment should be entered for the defendant and so decree.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT.
After his discharge in bankruptcy, Hargelrode made three payments
each of $50. Has he thus revived the debt?
The discharge is from a legal obligation. Although the state makes
many preposterous claims, it has not, through the courts, declared that
the extinction of the legal obligation is the extinction of the moral, although Hunt, J., indulges, in Allen v. Ferguson, 18 Wall. 1, 85 U. S., in
some cryptic remarks which may spring from the conception that the
state is supreme over morals, having power to suspend the Decalogue
and whatever other ethical code it may choose to disapprove.
The moral obligation, strange to say, produces, when coupled with a
promise to pay the debt, a legal obligation to pay it, although
neither the obligation nor the promise, alone, would do so. Stranger
still, not every moral obligation coupled with a promise, creates a legal
obligation. The moral obligation must have resulted from an act which
created a legal obligation. When that legal obligation has expired,
leaving the moral, that moral obligation, united with a new promise to
pay, recreates a legal obligation 'to pay. Bolton v. King, 105 Pa. 78;
Hobough v. Murphy, 114 Pa. 358; Murphy v. Crawford, 114 Pa. 496. So
the legal alchemists haye told us.
The promise it seems, must be express. Under the statute of limitations, which bars the remedy, it has been held that from a partial payment of the debt may be inferred a promise to pay the remainder, but
the courts have shrewdly discovered that a discharge in bankruptcy is
not a mere barring of the remedy but an extinction of the debt. See
cases supra. The distinction is purely verbal. A legal debt cannot survive the withdrawal of the remedies for its enforcement. The facts out
of which it grew, are not abolished by the discharge; nor the moral obligation to pay it. But, there being no longer a legal obligation to pay,
there is no legal debt. Under given new conditions, the courts will recreate a legal debt, that is, they will enforce the payment of the former
and for a time extinct debt. The facts which induce them thus to enforce it, have again created a legal debt; the same in amount, etc., as
the former debt, but nevertheless, a different, a new legal debt. The
new promise, not the old, is the basis of the action, and as such, must be
declared on; Bolton v. King, supra.
While a recognition of a debt barred by the limitary period, is sufficient ground for inferring a promise to pay, upon which inferred promise,
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an action can be sustained, and while therefore, a payment of a part of
a barred debt will revive the debt, it is necessary, in order to revive a
discharged debt, that the promise should be express; Allen v. Ferguson,
18 Wall 1; Bolton v. King, Hobough v. Murphy, Murphy v. Crawford,
supra. A partial payment is not such a promise; Institution for Savings
v. Littlefield, 6 Cush. 210; Merriam v. Bayley, 1 Cush. 77: Laurence v.
Harrington, 122 N. Y. 408; Matthewson v. Needham, 81 Kansas, 340;
105 Pac. 436. There is nothing more imputed to Hargelrode. He made
no express promises. He simply paid.
The learned court below has arrived at the proper judgment.
Judgment affirmed.

FLETCHER v. TATE.
Rescission of Conveyance for Misinterpretation of Value.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Tate was employed by Fletcher to pay the taxes on certain lands.
A year after their payment, Fletcher asked him what the lands were
worth, in his opinion. He reported that in his judgment, they were
worth $40 an acre. They were in fact worth $70. Two years subsequently Tate offered to buy the land at $45 an acre. Fletcher agreed to
sell, and conveyed. Subsequently learning that the land was worth $70
an acre, Fletcher files this bill to rescind the conveyance.
Edwards for Plaintiff.
Stafford for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
BADGER, J.-We cannot agree with the plaintiff's contention that
Tate was the agent of Fletcher in the transaction in question. Tate was
employed merely to pay the taxes on the land and was compensated for
these services. This first relationship between the two parties was in
no way connected with the reporting of the value of the land by Tate.
This report was made a year after the relationship of principal and agent
ceased, and the facts disprove, rather than prove, that a, new and similar
relationship existed at this time, since Tate received no pay for his report and since the necessary qualities of an agency are absent. "An
agency terminates when the business for which the agency was created is
completely executed." [Rowe v. Rand, 111 Il1. 206]. This first relationship was in the nature of a special agency, that is, there was a delegation of power to do a single act, namely to pay the taxes. In Diff's Esstate, 4 Clark 87, it is held, "If the agent exceed the special and limited
authority conferred upon him, the principal is not bound by his acts, but
they are mere nullities so far as he is concerned."
Tate's agency
ceased, therefore, when the taxes were paid and he had received his
compensation. No new agency was established, but Fletcher asked
Tate for his valuation of the land simply because Tate was a business
acquaintance in a former transaction.
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The information asked for was the value of the land in Tate's judgment. The fact that he reported that it was worth $40, when it really
was worth $70, does not prove that to Tate it was worth the latter
price, and if in his judgment it was worth only $40 there was no duty
upon him to obtain the opinion of others in order to be sure of its real
value. Whether or not Tate made the statement for the purpose of defrauding Fletcher would be a question of fact for a jury. But as we
view the case there can be no imputation of fraud on the part of Tate.
The counsel for the plaintiff argues that the lapse of two years time
between the report and the offer to buy is to be construed against the defendant but such a construction cannot be placed upon it, for such a
length of time intervening makes it very improbable that both parties
were relying on the report of two years before as the basis for their
transactions. It is of the highest likelihood that one or other, or both,
of the parties had, by this time, forgotten the given value of the land; if
Tate no longer remembered, there was no fraud in his statement that
the value two years before was $40, for in* his offer of $45 he would be
merely bargaining, with Fletcher, and his two years previous report
should not be considered. If Fletcher had been the one to forget what
the land's value was two years before, he should, if he were anxious to
obtain the market price, have made inquiry as to its present value, and
the fact that he accepted Tate's offer of $45 without making such inquiry,
shows no fraud on defendant's part. Even if Fletcher had been relying
on the $40 valuation of the land two years before, it was encumbent upon
him to definitely ascertain the present value of the land, or run the
risk of selling at an inferior price, for the value of land is very often
considerably increased in two year's time, and the fact that he was offered
$45 where two years before the same land was valued at $5 less, should
have put him on his guard and have aroused a suspicion that the land's
value had considerably increased or that the valuation report had been
untrue, and thus have led to inquiry as to the present value.
Since the relationship of principal and agent did not exist at this
time, since no fraud can be imputed to Tate, and since Fletcher was
negligent in not ascertaining the present value of the land, this bill cannot be maintained and must be dismissed.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT.
At the time of the making of the contract in performance of which
the land was conveyed to Tate, no fiduciary relationship of any sort existed between Fletcher and Tate, nor was there, at anytime, any misrepresentation, fraudulent or innocent, by Tate. The most that can be said is
that Fletcher agreed to sell and subsequently conveyed his land to Tate in
ignorance of its real value. It does not even appear that Tate knew that
the land was worth more than he was paying for it.
The fact that a person who sold property was ignorant of its real
value, while it may in extreme cases constitute a defense to a suit for
specific performance is not a sufficient ground to justify a court of
equity in decreeing a rescission 'of the contract. Davidson v. Little, 22
Pa. 245; Graham v. Pancoast, 30 Pa. 89.
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The plaintiff contends, however, that the conduct of Tate in reporting the land as worth $40 per acre in 1908 cannot be disregarded and must
be considered a sufficient cause for rescission. It is nowhere made to appear that Tate knew at the time he made the report that the land was
worth more than $40 per acre, and Tate's report must therefore be considered as an innocent misrepresentation.
Innocent misrepresentation is, according to the weight of authority,
a sufficient ground for rescission but the conveyance to Tate cannot be
cancelled because of the misrepresentation because (1) it was a mere expression of an opinion; (2) it was not made for the purpose and with the
design of procuring Fletcher to act; (3) it does not appear that it was
relied upon by Fletcher.
Tate was asked to report "what in his judgment the land was
worth." In other words he was asked his opinion. It is perfectly consistent with the facts as they appear in the record that Tate truly stated
his opinion. If so there was no misrepresentation.
In order that a contract may be rescinded on the ground of misrepresentation the representation must have been made with the design of inducing the other party to act.
When Tate reported the valuation of the land he had not begun negotiations for its purchase. His intention to purchase the land may not
have been formed until 1910. There is nothing to show that it was
formed before that time. How then can it be said that it was made with
the purpose and design of inducing Fletcher to sell the property? If it
had been made with such design, is it likely that Tate would have waited
two years before beginning negotiations for the purchase of the land?
"To furnish ground for rescission of a contract a false representation
must have been made with the intention to deceive, that is, with the intention that it be acted upon" 14 A & E. 103. In the great majority of
cases in which rescission was granted because of misrepresentation the
representation "was made during and formed a part of the negotiation
which terminated in a contract" 2 Pom. Eq. 1556.
To entitle a person to relief because of a misrepresentation it must
be shown that it did actually mislead and deceive, or in other words that
it was relied upon by the party complaining. This is the rule whether
the false representation be made the ground of an action for deceit or a
ground for rescission of a contract; and it is true in equity as well as at
law; 14 A & E. 107; Richards Ap. 100 Pa. 51. "An intention to deceive
and a false statement even on a material point will not overthrow a bargain unless the statement was the means of producing it." Phipps v.
Buchman, 30 Pa. 401; Ackman v. Jaster, 179 Pa. 465.
It does not appear that Fletcher relied upon the report of Tate. It
was made two years before the conveyance. The value of land may
change greatly in two years. It is not probable that a person in selling
land would rely upon a mere opinion of another expressed two years previous. It was Fletcher's duty to offer evidence to show that he had relied upon the report of Tate. Ackman v. Jaster, 179 Pa. 465.
Fletcher knew that the value of the land had increased in Tate's estimation because Tate offered and gave $45 per acre. He knew therefore that Tate was not relying upon his previous report. Knowing that
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Tate no longer held his former opinion it is not probable that Fletcher
relied upon it and that it was "an immediate cause of his conduct which
altered his relations."
The plaintiff would have us look still farther back: back to the year
1907 when Tate was the agent of Fletcher for the payment of taxes. His
contention is that the fiduciary relation which existed at that time must
be considered and constitutes in connection with subsequent events a
ground for rescission.
The agency of Tate was for A limited purpose, the payment of taxes,
and for a limited time, one year. This agency had terminated one year before Tate was asked his opinion as to the value of the land and three years
before the conveyance. After one has performed his office as agent or
has in good faith severed his relation as agent, he is free to take up negotiations in his own interest, and can act adversely to bis former principal as fully as any other person. McKinley v. Irvine, 13 Ala. 681;
Bucher v. Bucher, 86 Ill. 377; Tounteun Coal Co. v. Phelphs, 93 Ind. 271.
In Collar v. Ford, 45 Iowa 331, it is held that "the fact that one was
employed to ascertain and report to the owner who lived in another state,
the amount of taxes due on a piece of land, which he did, did not constitute him an agentwith respect to the land so as to charge him with fraud
in buying the same for himself for less than its actual value."
See also Schwartz v. Yearly 31 Md. 270. Dennison v. Aldrich, 114
Mo. App. 700; Foster v. Calhoun, Dudley 75.
Judgment affirmed.

ATCHISON v. CITY OF PITTSBURG.
Liability of City for Personal Injury Arising from Neglects of

School Officers.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Atchison was injured by the negligent operation of an elevator in a
public school building, in the city of Pittsburg.
Felton for Plaintiff.
Lokuta for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
SAVIDGE, J.-The city of Philadelphia is not liable in damages for
injuries sustained by a pupil in consequence of a defect in a public school
building, as the duty to construct, maintain, supervise and control all
public school buildings in the county of Philadelphia is exclusively vested
by legislative enactment in the board of public education and the several
sectional school boards of the first school district of Pennsylvania.
Ayer's App. 122 Pa. 266; Board of Public Education v. Ransley, 209 Pa,
51.
The same rights were given to the city of Pittsburg, Act Feb. 12,
186.), P. L. 150, Act June 12, 1878, P. L. 182.
The school authorities are state agents. Ford v. School Dist. 121 Pa,
543; Erie School Dist. v. Fuess, 98 Pa. 600.
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Where the injury complained of results from the negligent performance or non-performance of a governmental duty or function, no liability
attaches to the principal. And this is especially true where the officials
whose negligence is complained of are absolutely free of municipal control.
Winpenny v. Phila., 7 Phila, 111, and Ford v. Kendall Boro. School Dist.,
121 Pa. 543.
By the Act of May 8, 1854, P. L. 617, every township, borough and
city of the commonwealth is made a separate school district. Its affairs
are not managed by taetownships or municipal authorities, but by boards
of school directors or controllers elected for that purpose. "School districts as quasi corporations belonging to tha public school system, have
no necessary connection with municipal government. Ayar's Appeal,
122 Pa. 266. "School directors are by no means municipal officers.
They are not invested with any of the municipal powers, nor are they
charged with the performance of municipal functions. Chalfant v. Edwards et al, 173 Pa. 246.
The city had no voice in the selection of the school officers and had
no power to remove them. Those officers, in the exercise of their furctions and discharge of their public duty were free from municipal control. If they failed to provide and maintain suitable and adequate
buildings for the accommodation of the public schools, the municipality
had no corporate right to interfere. The dijty to see that the school
buildings were kept in proper repair was upon the officers of the school
district, a quasi municipal corporation constituted for the sole purpose
of the administration of the commonwealth's system of public education.
The officers were elected or appointed, in obedience to an act of the legislature, to perform apublic service, the administration of the system of
public schools, the maintenance and support of which the state has assumed as one of its duties and functions. The school districts ar( mere
agents of the state, for purposes purely governmental. The officers
through whom they must act are chosen in the manner directed by the
state, and their duties are defined by the sovereign power, and such officers perform a public service in which the district has no corporate interest and from which it derives no advantage in its corporate capacity.
Such officers cannot be regarded as servants of the school district, for
whose negligence in the discharge of their duty the school district can be
held liable in the absence of a statute imposing such liability. Bucher v.
Northumberland Co., 209 Pa. 618; Commonwealth v. Brice, 22 Pa. 211.
'In view of the above authorities we are convinced that this action is
brought against the wrong party, namely "The Muni'ipality of the City
of Pittsburg."
Judgment for the defendant.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT.
It is generally held that a municipal corporation has a dual character,
the one public and the other private, and exercises correspondingly twofold functions and duties, and the question whether a municipal corporation may be made to respond in damages for a tort of misfeasance or
non-feasance in connection with a particular department of the corpo a
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tion's activity, depends, according to the weight of authority, upon the
question whether the duties of that department pertain to a public or
private function of the corporation. In the former case the corporation
is not liable; in the latter it is; 28 Cyc. 1257; 20 A. & E. 1193; 25 L. R.
A. V. S. 88. The same criterion applies to torts in connection with
buildings used by the corporation. 28 Cyc. 1308; 20 A. & E. 1205.
In accordance with the principles above stated, the great weight of
authority holds that injuries caused by defects or negligence, in or around
a school house or yard, may not be redressed by a civil action against the
municipality, as the maintenance of schools is a public function, 28 Cyc.,
1309 and cases cited. And it has been specifically held that a municipality
is not liable for the negligence of a servant in operating a passenger
elevator in a school building on the ground that the duty of maintaining
school buildings was a public function. -Columbia etc. Co. v. Louisville,
35 L. R. A. V. S. 88.
The distinction between public and private functions has not, however, always been recognized where the tort arose in connection with the
negligent construction or maintenance of real estate held by a city.
Kruse v. Erie, 169 Pa. 598; Glase v. Philadelphia, 169 Pa. 488.
Thus it has been held that a city is liable for injuries to a school boy
suffered by reason of negligence in the maintenance of a board walk
running from a main school building to an annex on property owned by
the city and devoted to the use of a public school. Powers v. Philadelphia, 18 Sup. 624. In the course of its opinion the court said: "Municipal
corporations are liable for the improper use and management of their
property to the same extent and in the same manner as natural persons.
Pre-eminently should this be true of school children, who are not only
invited, but under compulsion to attend the city's school." And in Fox
v. Philadelphia, 208 Pa. 127, the city has held liable for a death caused
by the negligence of the operator of an elevator in the City Hall.
On the other hand in Ford v. Kendall School District, 121 Pa. 543,
the school district was held not to be liable for injuries caused to a pupil
by the negligence of the janitor in operating a stove in a school room on
the ground that the school district was but an agent of the commonwealth
in the great public charity of education. See also School Dis. v. Fness,
98 Pa. 600.
It is submitted that, regardless of the correctness of the distinction
between property used by a municipal corporation for public purposes
and property used for private purposes, if the public school system is a
public.charity when under the control and management of a school district, the system ought still to be a public charity though it is maintained
and controlled by a city.
The decision in Powers v. Philadelphia was based to a large extent,
upon the decision in Bregel v. Philadelphia, 135 Pa. 451, but, as was said
in Rosenblet v. Philadelphia, 28 Sup. Ct. 597, "That case is clearly distinguishable from Ford v. School District and the case with which we are
now dealing." In Bregel V. Philadelphia there was a nuisance to adjoining property and the decision was to the effect that the fact that
property is owned and controlled by a municipal corporation, or a quasi
municipal corporation, or a public charity, does not authorize the owner
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to maintain upon it a nuisance injurious to surrounding property, nor does
it exempt such owner from liability to one who has suffered special injury from such nuisance. See Rosenblet v. Philadelphia.
The decisi6n in Powers v. Philadelphia was subsequently overruled
in Rosenblet v. Philadelphia on the ground that, if the school district
were liable under such circumstances (which the court said was n t so),
the city would not be liable as a municipal corporation, as the city in its
corporate capacity had no voice in the selection of officers whose negligence resulted in the accident nor could it supervise or control them in
their management of the school property.
The decision in Rosenblet v. Philadelphia and Board of Education v.
Ransley, are determinative of the present case and the judgment of the
learned court below is therefore affirmed.

COMMONWEALTH v. CRISPELL.
Pointing an Unloaded Revolver at a Man
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Crispell, in order to frighten Anderson, pointed a revolver at Anderson. The revolver was not loaded. Crispell knew this. Anderson did
not and was much frightened.
Best for Plaintiff.
Challis for defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
UNDERWOOD, J.-There is a marked difference of opinion among
the authorities and in the different states upon the question of criminal
assault involved in this case. This Court has come to thd conclusion
however, that the weight of authority and the decisions throughout the
country favors the view that there can be no criminal assault without a
present intention, as well as a present ability, of using some violence
against the person of another.
In Chapman v. State, 78 Ala. 463, Somerville, J., reviewed the
authorities on this question thoroughly, and decided that the better
view was, that presenting an unloaded gun at one who supposes it to be
loaded, although within the distance the gun would carry if loaded, was
not, without more, such an assault as could be punished criminally, although it might sustain a civil suit for damages. In support of this he
declared "The conflict of authorities on this subject is greatly attributable to a failure to observe the distinction between these two classes of
cases. A civil action would rest upon the invasion of a person's "right
to live in society without being put in fear of personal harm" and can
often be sustained by proof of a negligent act resulting in unintentional
injury (Peterson v. Hoffner, 26 Am. Rep. 81; Cooley on Torts). The
approved definition of an assault involves the idea of an inchoate violence to the person of another with the present means of carrying the
2 Greenleaf Ev. See. 82;.. Roscoe's Cr. Ev 296;
intent into effect.
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People v. Lilley, 43 Mich. 521; 1 Russell Cr. (9 Ed) 1019; State v. Blackwell, 9 Ala. 79; Tarver v. State, 43 Ala. 354.
In People v. Lilley, 43 Mi:h. 521, the Court said "an assault is defined to be an inchoate violence to the person of another with the present
means of carrying the intent into effect. Threats are not sufficient;
there must be proof of violence actually offered and this within such a
distance as that harm might ensue if the party was not prevented."
In addition to the above cited authorities we would present the cases
of State v. Napper, 6 Nev. 113; McKay v. State, 44 Texas 43; People v.
Jacobs, 29 Cal. 579; Reg. v. St. George, 9 C. & P; and Greenleaf's Ev.
No. 59 in support of our decision.
There are authorities however, holding that assault is an apparent
attempt by violence to do corporal hurt to another ignoring entirely all
question of criminal intent. We have come to the conclusion that the
wrong (untrue) tests of assault were applied to those cases; either the
tendency of an act to constitute a breach of the peace or the mere fact
of unlawfully putting one in fear and creating alarm in his mind. Abusive and opprobrious language has a tendency to produce a breach of the
peace, yet no words, however violent, can, at common law, constitute an
assault. Chapman v. State, 78 Ala. 463. Unlawfully putting one in fear
cannot be the true test: for one may obviously be assaulted, although in
complete ignorance of the fact and therefore entirely free from harm.
Chapman v. State, 78 Ala. 463; Peolpe v. Lilley, 43 Mich. 521.
There appears to be no fixed or approved definitioli of assault nor
any cases which definitely decide upon the essentials of this crime in
Pennsylvania. The nearest approach to a decision on this subject however, is found in Butler v. Stockdale, 19 Super. 98, and in Commonwealth
v. Brungess et al, 23 Pa. C. C. 13. In the former the Court sald that an
assault was (is) an intentional attempt by force to do an injury to the
person of another. In the latter it wa- said that "an assault is made
by one who, in striking distance of another, attempts to strike him or
hit him; it is an attempt to strike." In connection with this last case, it
should be noted that said Court declared an assault to be an attempt to
strike, and not an apparent attempt to strike.
In view of the authorities cited above we are of the opinion that defendant Crispell cannot be held on an indictment for assault.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT.
That one who points a revolver at another under the circumstances
set forth in this case shouid be held criminally responsible therefor, is
nowhere doubted, but whether the act of so doing constitutes a criminal
assault must be considered an open question.
The leading case in support of the doctrine that conduct of this character does not amount to an assault is Chapman v. S, which has been
sufficiently set forth by the learned court below. To the same effect, in
addition to the cases cited by the learned court below, are: State v. Godfrey, 17 Oreg. 300, 20 Pac. 625; People v. Shyva(Cal); 76 Pac. 814; Klein
v. S, 9 Ind. App.; Law v. St., 30 Ala. 14; Burton v. S, 3 Tex. App. 408:
S v. Burton, 2 Penne (Del.) 472; S v. Hunt, 25 R. '75; S v. Mears 86, Mo.
269; and see a learned note, 2 Green Crim L. Cas. 269.
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On the other hand there are many cases holding that such conduct
constitutes an assault. St. v. Archer, 8 Kan. App. 737; 54 Pac. 927; S.
v. Taylor, 20 Kan, 643; S. v. Smith, 2 Humph 157; Keefe v. S,19 Ark.
190; P. v. Moorehouse, 6 N. Y. Supp. 763; S.v. Sherherd, 10 Iowa 126;
Com. v. White, 110 Mass. 407.
The doctrine of the latter cases has been adopted by Bishop, Wharton and McClain, who are the recognized authorities upon questions of
criminal law. In Bishop's New Crim. L. 832, the decision of Chapman v.
State is elaborately considered and disapproved, and in McClain's Crim. L.
p. 223, it is said, "The general proposition supported by the weight of
authority is that if the assailant makes threats to injure being in an apparent condition to carry them out and does act with apparent intention of carrying them out, thus putting the assailed in fear, an asassault is committed, even though by reason of facts not known to the
person assailed, it would be impossible to commit the injury. The same
doctrine is asserted in Clark & Marshall on Crimes, p. 227, where it is
said, "The better opinion is to the effect that if a person presents a gun
at another, and thereby reasonably puts him in fear there is an assault
whether there is an actual intention to injure or not." See also p. 281
and Wharton Crim. L. p. 606.
In a recent case before a federal court, the court after stating the
doctrine of Chapman v. S. said, "We do not concur in this statement of
the law and in our opinion the true rule is stated by Mr. Bishop in his
work on Criminal Law in the following language: 'There is no need for
the party assailed to be put-in actual peril if only a well founded apprehension is created: for his suffering is the same in one case as in the
other and the breach of public peace is the same."' The court decided
that an assault may be committed by pointing at another an unloaded
pistol if the person at whom it is pointed does not know that it is unloaded
and is put in apprehension by the act. This view is also taken by
Stephen, the leading English writer on the criminal law.
The Pennsylvania cases cited by the learned court below are not decisive of the present case. Butler v. Stockdale was a civil case in which
the question before the court was entirely different from that in the
present case. Moreover, even in Chapman v. S,the case upon which the
learned court below principally relied, it was admitted that the petson
pointing the pistol would be guilty of a civil assault. Com. v. Burgess
was a lwif court case and the question presented by the present case
was not considered.
In view of the fact that it is generally admitted that one who points
a pistol at another under the circumstances set forth in this case should
be held criminallyresponsible; that the suffering of the assailed party is
the same as if the Pistol were loaded; that the tendency to cause a breach
of the peace is the same as if the pistol were loaded; and that the weight
of authority supports the doctrine that such conduct constitutes an assault, we think that the decision of the lower court upon this point was:
erroneous.
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SOPER v. RAILROAD COMPANY.

Death by Negligence-Intervention of Fatal Dose of Drug.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Soper was so seriously injured as a result of the negligence of the defendant company that all the physicians agreed that death would soon
result. While in this condition a nurse in the hospital administered an
overdose of a drug -prescribed for the temporary relief of his suffering.
His death resulted. Had this accident not occurred he might have lived
a few days longer. It was admitted by all that under all the circumstances the nurse was not to be blamed for her mistake. This is trespass by Soper's widow.
Dipple for Plaintiff.
Foley for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
HANKEE, J.-In the case in hand, the question of law to be decided,
is whether the intervening agency which directly caused Soper's death,
would relieve the company from liability.
There is no doubt about the widow's right to sue. The persons entitled to recover damages for any injury causing death shall be the husband, widow, children or parents of the deceased, and no other relative,
etc. (S. P. Digest 3241 sec. 4). Under this act, the right of action is in
the widow and the children are not only not necessary, but not even
proper parties. 84 Pa..419. 204 Pa. 229.
The action shall be brought -within one year after death and not
thereafter (S. P. Dig. 3243 sec. 5 e). Since the facts do not state otherwise, we will take it for granted that this requirement has been complied
with, which leaves us"for discussion the main question stated above.
To recover here, the plaintiff must show that the death of the husband was the natural and probable consequence of the defendant conkpany's negligence, such a consequence as under the circumstances of the
case might or ought to have been foreseen by them to flow- from their
act. 85 Pa. 293. In determining the accountability for the consequence of a wrongful act, the immediate, and not the remote cause is to
be considered.
Here, Soper was so badly injured as a result of the company's negligence that all the physicians agreed that death would soon result. Had
this overdose of the drug not been administered by the nurse, he might
have lived a few days longer. In other words, his death would have resulted from the injury he received through the negligence of the defendant company-the injury he received was the natural and probable consequence of their negligence.
In 62 Pa, 353, 1870-Penn. R. R. Co. v. Kerr, it is held that the person committing the first act of negligence is not liable for all its consequences. In determining accountability for the consequences of a wrongful act, the immediate, and not the remote, cause is to be considered.
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Here the injury he received was the immediate cause of his death. The
mistake of the nurse simply hastened his death by a day or so.
The question in hand is one for the jury to determine whether the
facts constituted a continuous succession of events, so linked together,
that they become a natural whole, of whether .the chain of events is so
broken, that they become independent and the final result cannot be said
to be the natural and probable consequence of the primary cause-the
ngigence of defendants. All the court can do is to aid the jury by
pointing to the relation of the facts. The maxim causa prozima non
-remotaspectatur should form the foundation of their decision. Penn.
R. R. v. Hope, 80 Pa. 373. In 5 Supr. 22 it is held that the question
whether defendant's negligence was the proximate cause of the injury was
for the jury under all the circumstances of the case.
In 57 N. Y. 489 (Lyons v. Erie Railway Co.) it is held-"In an action
to recover damages for injuries alleged to have been sustained by D's
negligence, where defendant had given evidence tending to show that
exercise taken by the plaintiff might have tended to retard recovery and
that quiet would have been better, evidence that P was advised
by his physicians that it was right and beneficial to exercise was proper."
In this case, the testimony that there was an overdose of the drug was
permissible, also that it was a mistake and that the mistake hastened his
death by just a day or so. In the case above cited (57 N. Y. 489) it is
further held that "One injured by negligence of another is bound to use
ordinary care to effect his cure and restoration; but heis not responsible
for a mistake, and when he acts in good faith and under the advice of a
competent physician, even if it is erroneous, the error will not shield the
wrong-doer." Applying this to the present case we find that the cases
are almost similar. Ordinary care in the hospital was evidently used to
effect his cure and restoration and Soper was not responsibie for the
mistake made by the nurse, who acted in good faith, since all admitted
she could not be blamed for her mistake.
According to the facts of the case, we hold that the injury to plaintiff's husband through the negligence of the company was the immediate
cause of his death, which was hastened a short time by the nurse's mistake.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT.
The act of assembly enacts that "Whenever death shall be occasioned
by unlawful violence or negligence" etc., the widow, etc., "may maintain an action for and recover damages for the death thus occasioned."
In order to be responsible, the Railroad Company must have "occasioned" the death of the plaintiff's husband. The husband would have
died in a few days, had the toxic drug not been administered to him.
But it was administered to him. Was the death which did occur the result of the injury, or of the drug? Had it appeared that the drug alone
would not have killed, that, only in cooperation with the injury, it killed,
then we should say that the drug and the injury were cooperating causes.
Death would have been "occasioned" by both; by either. There are no
single causes. All affects emerge from a mass of conditions, the absence of any of which would prevent their coming. The drug is a cause
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of death, only because it acts on the brain, the heart, the kidneys in a
certain way; but it does not act in this way but for its intrinsic qualities,
and their intrinsic qualities. That the thermometer is at 32 degrees does
not cause water to freeze, for it does not cause alcohol or mercury to
freeze. The constitution of the water is a cooperating cause; so is its
being under pressure; its being still, etc. If then the drug would not
have killed when it did but for the prior injury, and the injury would not
have killed when death occurred, but for the dose of poison, but would
have killed at some later time, both would be causes or occasions, and
the defendant, being negligent, would be liable.
The evidence before the lower court however was that "an overdose
of a drug" was administered, and "death resulted;" that is, apparently,
resulted from this overdose. It does not appear that its fatality was the
result of the injury; that death would not have happened, had the man
not been injured. If the dose would have killed when it did, even had
the man not been previously hurt,-as may well have been the case-the
dose, not the injury occasioned the death which occurred. It may well
be that a death later, would have happened, even had the drug not been
administered, but that is not incompatible with the drug's being the sole
cause of the death that actually did becur. A may shoot B so that he will
die in ten days. X may the next day shoot B through the head, the heart,
the lungs, so that he dies at once, and would have died at once, even had
he not already been shot. In that case, the death will be solely caused
by X. X will, by his intervening killing, have made it impossible for A
to be the killer. He may have been guilty of an assault with intent to
kill; but not of a homicide. 1 Whart. Crim Law, 176.
But the act of administering the drug was itself occasioned by the
injuries. They required medical attention, and the use of anodynes, ani
other pharmaceutical substances. The nurse administered an overdose
without intention so to do, and without censurable negligence. We think
the acts of the nurse, made apparently necessary by the injuries, is the
effects of them, and that it, in turn being the cause of the death, the injury must be considered the cause thereof. The cause of the cause of
an effect is the cause of the effect. "It is one of the ordinary consequences of a wound, that a medical man should be called in to treat
it, and it is one of the probable incidents of medical practice, that the
patient should die under treatment. And the person inflicting the wound
is responsible for this as one of the consequences which in the natural
course of events, result from his unlawful act."
1 Whar..Crim. Law,
176; 21 Cyc. 700; Com. v. Eisenhower, 181 Pa. 470; Sullivan v. Com., 93
Pa. 284, 294; Sauter v. R. R. Co., 66 N. Y. 50.
We think it was properly concluded by the trial court that the negligence of the defendant caused the injury to plaintiff's husband which
caused the administration to him of the toxic dose, which caused his death.
That from a railroad's negligence, injury should result, and that from
such injury should follow the necessity of administering anodyne or hypnotic drugs, and that, in this administration, in a certain number of instances, mistakes should without negligence occur, resulting in overdoses
and death, are matters not beyond the duty of knowledge and anticipation. That negligence will be a cause of them, is not so improbable, as
to prevent responsibility for them.
Judgment affirmed.

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

229

VINCENT v. McGARVEY.
Recognizing Voices Over the Telephone.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Vincent is a grocer. He was called up by telephone. Asking the
name of the person who spoke to him he received the name John McGarvey, of No. 24 Orange street. The speaker told Vincent to let X, who
would call later, have as much as four pounds of sugar and three pounds
of coffee, and that he, the speaker would pay for them. Vincent testified that he had never heard MeGarvey speak over theptelephone but that
he had heard him speak seven or eight times in somewhat protracted
conversations, the last of which had occurred three years before. McGarvey testified that he did not speak through the phone nor authorize
anyone to use his name. Verdict for $1.50.
Jackson for Plaintiff.
Spotts for Defendant.
OPINION OF COURT,
DUGHI, J.-In the former trial the testimony of the defendant was
admitted to the following effect: that he did not speak through the telephone or authorize anyone to use his name. This evidence established
beyond a doubt the fact that the offer made to the pliaintiff did not come
from McGarvey, the person sought to be charged in this action. Therefore the alleged contract was not completed by the act of Vincent in accepting the offer, or order and in delivering the goods to X.
We need not decide the question of adequate consideration, because
if an offer is accepted by one person which he believes was made by a
certain other party but which was in fact made by a third party, there is
no contract formed binding the second party by the acceptance of the
first party. Thus: if A accepts an offer which he believes to have been
made by B, but which was in fact made by C, A can not hold B liable on
the contract.
The only evidence in this case tending to support the plaintiff's contention that there was a valid contract existing between the parties is
the testimony of the plaintiff, viz: that he had never heard him speak
over the telephone but that he had heard McGarvey speak over the telephone but that he had heard him speak seven or eight times in protracted conversations, the last of which occurred three years before.
This evidence as well as that of the defendant, which was to the effect that he did not speak to the plaintiff over the telephone was submitted to the jury and they found for the plaintiff.
The only question in this appeal is as to the admissibility of the plaintiff's testimony. The authorities seem to agree as a general proposition
that conversations over the telephone are not admissible in evidence unless the voice heard is fully and satisfactorily identified as that of the alleged speaker. As to what constitutes sufficient identification the courts
of various jurisdictions are in conflict, and the rule has never been satisfactorily laid down in Pennsylvania. The Pennsylvania cases cited by
counsel for defendant holding that telephone conversations are not admissible seems to indicate that if the case at bar were presented to the
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Superior Court the evidence would be ruled out. Durham v. McMicheal,
214 Pa. 485, holds that the voice was not sufficiently identified and that
it was error to permit witness to testify as to what he had heard of the
conversation over or through the telephone.
In a recent case in Georgia, the plaintiff's agent obtained a telephone
connection with the Western Union Telegraph Company's office and after
being assurred that it was the said office, repeated to a person answering
him, a message to be transmitted. It did not appear the agent of the
plaintiff recognized the voice of the person answering him as being the
voice of one of the~agents of the Telegraph Company and it was not otherwise known to him, nor was it shown that the person to whom he was
talking was the agent of the Telegraph Company. The Supreme Court
held this evidence was not sufficient to support a verdict for the plaintiff,
and that the jury properly found for the defendant. 6 L. R. N. 1182.
The communication in the present case was of such a nature as to require complete identification of the speaker. Vincent was not justified
from his knowledge of McGarvey's voice in assuming that the
speaker was McGarvey on his, the speaker's statement alone that
he was McGarvey. For by his own admissions he testified that he had
not heard him speak in conversation for three years, and even then
he had not had conversations with him, but that he had just heard him
speak, which latter we think is not as likely to impress upon the mind of
the listener the tones and qualities of another voice as strongly as when
engaged in actual conversation with speaker.
Again we think it was the plaintiff's duty to ascertain more fully before he delivered the goods to X that he, X, was the duly authorized
agent of McGarvey's. His carelessness in failing to do this and his delivery of the goods to an unknown person~shows such neglect as to prevent his recovery. In 23 Mo. App. 451, Globe Printing Co. v. Stahl, the
court, in its opinion, laid down the principle that when the communication was of such a nature as to require identification of the individual
there must be evidence of such identity to make the communication admissible in evidence.
Wolfe v. Mo. & Pacific R. R. Co., 97 Mo. 473 and Globe Printing Co.
v. Stahl, 23 Mo. App. 451 cited by counsel for plaintiff are not directly in
point. In both of these cases the relation of the parties in conversation
was reversed, the testimony offered being the conversation of the
sender of the message and not of the one receiving it, as in this case.
Where a reply is made by a business man in his office to a communication over the telephone, he is a competent witness to what he himself
said, but not as to what was said by the party in communication with
him.
In this case had the call been originated by Vincent and he had been
put.in commnnication with the instrument in ]McGarvey's store according
to regular telephone usages and had been assured, after asking as to the
identity of the person to whom he was speaking, that it was the defendant, it would have been admissible in evidence. If for no other reason,
this evidence should be excluded on the grounds of public policy. For if
a new trial were not granted here it would open a broad avenue for the
perpetration of fraud on innocent customers or patrons of storekeepers
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For anyone could then call up a merchant in his place of business and
place a large order for his wares, and on being asked his name could give
the name of a person known to the speaker as being a man of credit with
the merchant, and the innocent party or patron could be held responsible
for the amount of the goods by the merchant, which would be rank fraud
and injustice. We think it a safer and better rule to put the responsibility of such transactions on the merchant and if by carelessness and
neglect, he should fail to establish beyond a doubt as to the identity of
the one placing the order, and give his goods to a person not known to
him to be a responsible person, as the plaintiff did in the present case,we think the merchant alone should suffer.
Therefore we think testimony of the plaintiff was improperly admitted and are of opinion motion for new trial should be granted.
Motion granted.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT.
Somebody, calling himself John McGarvey, ordered from the plaintiff, a grocer, sugar and coffee, promising to pay for them. John McGarvey is sued for the price. The sole question is, was there sufficient
evidence that he was the person who, calling himself by that name,
spoke over the telephone.
The plaintiff did not see him. The usual mode of identifying a man
is by the detection of visual similarities of countenance, stature, bulk,
gait, swiftness of motion, etc. But, while the face and other parts of
the body of one man are so seldom like those of another, -that by means
of them we can affirm or deny identity with great certainty, the voice is
almost as characteristic. If it is true that no two human faces that we
have seen, are indistinguishable, it is equally true that no two human
voices are so alike that they cannot be discriminated. "It has been properly held," says Wigmore, 1 Evid. p. 755, "that a witness may testify to
a person's identity from his voice alone.
Nor is there any rule that the identification by voice is inadmissible,
unless the speaker is near the hearer; or speaks in a large room, or in
the open air. Perhaps, if one spoke through a tin or brass trumpet,
another, who had not heard him before, so speak, would not be allowed
to compare the sound of his voice, normally exerted, with the sound thus
made by the medium of the trumpet. Nevertheless, the court has refused to say that A, who had heard B talk under ordinary conditions,
and heard some one talk through the soil-pipes of ajail was unable safely
to identify the latter as the f6rmer, by the perceived similarity of the
sounds. Brown v. Commonwealth, 75 Pa. 319. In that case the voice
causes vibrations, not merely of the air but also of the pipe, which in
turn, modifies the vibrations or the air.
The telephone differs from the soil-pipe, or the trumpet, in that it
does not transmit atmospheric vibrations from the speaker's mouth to
the hearer's ear. There are vibrations at one end of the wire, which
cause intermissions in the flow of the electric current, and these intermissions cause at the other end, another but corresponding set of vibrations. The hearer does not hear the speaker's voice at all, but a set of
sounds similar in tone and quality, to the speaker's voice. If this sin,-
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ilarity is sufficiently close, the speaker may be as well identified by the
secondary voice, the telephonic voice, if we may so term it, as by the
natural voice. This similarity is a matter of experience, and most
courts that have dealt with the subject have so far taken judicial notice
of it, as that they concede the possibility of identification by means of
it. "It is generally conceded" says Wigmore, 3 Evid. p. 2923, "that a
person may be recognized and identified by his voice, if the hearer is acquainted with the speaker's voice. Assuming then, that B is thus acquainted with V's voice, and that voices can sometimes be distinguished
on the telephone, and that.B did in this instance distinguish A's voice,
then B's belief that A was the speaker is founded on sufficient evidence.
This much seems to be generally accepted." It is not necessary that B
should have grown familiar with what we have termed A's telephonic
voice, in order to identify a particular speech of his through the telephone. There may be conditions under which such identification is impossible, just as there are, when the natural voice could notbe identified; e.
g. when there are commingling sounds; when the voice is heard through
a wall or some other medium than the air; but there is still a large
percentage of cases where such identification is feasible. We think
that if B is familiar with A's voice, he may in most cases, identify his
telephone voice. Cf. Nat. Bank v. Smith, 7 Dist. 182.
The question is always, whether B is sufficiently familiar with A's
natural voice. In Irving v. Walker, 27 Super. 366, the identifying witness "was not acquainted with Walker'a voice and could not identify it."
In Dunham v. McMichael, 214 Pa. 485, the witness who undertoo i to say
that the speaker through the telephone was A, confessed that "he did
not know the defendant, had never seen her, and had never heard her
voice before," unless it was she (A) who had once before spoken through
the 'phone. He did not know that it was A who had thus before spoken.
The learned court below seems to doubt not the possibility of identification by the telephone voice, but the sufficiency of the witness' knowledge of McGarvey's natural voice, to institute a comparison between the
latter and the voice which he had heard on the telephone. He had
heard McGarvey spe k in protracted conversations 7 or 8 times. If he
was an observant person, it would be hazardous to say, as matter of law
that he could not identify the voice the ninth time he heard it. If, as is
assumed by the courts, A after seeing B write once, or twice, can identify a subsequently seen writing as made by B, Trickett, Witnesses, 622;
how will the court say that he cannot, having heard B talk once, twice,
seven times, identify a present voice as B's?
The learned court below intimates that the age of the auditions is an
insuperable obstacle to the perception of identity of the voices heard in
them, and of the voice now heard. But why? Can it assume that McGarvey's voice has changed in three years? Experience of adult human
voices does not justify such an assumption. Can it assume that a voice
heard in seven or eight long conversations will be forgotten in three
years. The average memory is not so little tenacious. The courts of
Pennsylvania have held that a boy ten years old, having seen W write
two or three letters to his father, and nine years later a memorandum of
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articles purchased, he could, at the age of 42, testify to W's authorship
of the writing then before the court. Trickett witnesses, 623.
Whether the plaintiff Vincent, was able from his experience of McGarvey's natural voice, to identify with it, the telephone voice, was, we
think not for the court to decide, affirmatively or negatively, but for the
jury.
To prevent misconstruction of our opinion, it is well to observe that
the fact that the telephone-speaker called himself McGarvey is of no
consequence. The identification must rest, not on the speaker's professions, but upon the perception of the similarity of McGarvey's natural
voice, and of the voice heard by Vincent over the 'phone.
It follows that the judgment is reversed, and a venire f. d. n.
awarded.

BOOK REVIEW.
Pepper & Lewis' Digest of Statutes, 2d Edition. Fourth
Volumie. T. & J. W. JOHNSON CO., Philadelphia, 1911.
We have already observed upon the characteristics of this
important work, and we purpose now to direct attention to the
fourth volume. This volume is composed of three parts, a table
of Acts of Assembly from the beginning, covering 191 pages; a
table of cases cited in the digest, covering 219 pages, and an index to the entire work, embracing 621 pages. The scope note
to the table of Acts, states that it is a chronological list of all general statutes and special acts applicable to Philadelphia and
Pittsburg and other large communities. The acts are given in
full and the repealed, amended or obsolete sections of them are so
marked with reference to the repealing or amending act. This list
gives in tabular form a detailed history of the legislation of the
state from 1683 to 1907. This table is of extreme utility, and a
similar aid may be looked for elsewhere in vain.
Of the table of cases it is unnecessary to speak. It presumably contains all the cases cited, and indicates the places in the
Digest where the citations occur.
The Index seems to be particularly well done. The titles
in the digest are arranged alphabetically, and each title is
logically analyzed. In most cases, therefore, reference to the
Index is unnecessary. The Index is so full that any subject may
be readily found in it, and from it the places where it is treated
in the Digest.
This volume completes one of the most important and useful
works ever put at the service of the profession in Pennsylvania.

